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Abstract
When a firm operates in an industry with very large differences in
consumers’ willingness to pay for the service it offers, it faces a challenge in
the pricing decision. It wants to engage in price discrimination, but cannot
identify a given consumer’s market segment ex ante. When consumers’
willingness to pay is private information, a widely used sorting mechanism
is to offer a menu of two part tariffs, letting high demand and low demand
consumers self-select into distinct market segments by their tariff choice.
However, when the difference in consumers’ willingness to pay is very large,
simple two part tariffs are not longer sufficient to discriminate between
high and low demand segments; Despite the ability to price discriminate,
the firm still prefers to serve high demand consumers only. The model
suggests that it might be possible to discriminate between consumers by
other means than price-cost distortions; Low demand consumers face a two
part tariff with a per unit price possibly above marginal cost, together with
a restriction on usage, whereas high demand consumers face an efficient
two part tariff.
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1 Introduction
Some firms operate in industries with very large differences in consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for the services they offer. This can be confirmed by observing
consumers’ actual consumption patterns. For instance, in telecommunications
there is a big difference in consumption between low and high demand segments
for most services, e.g., call minutes on fixed line connections and mobile phones,
and download/upload volume on broadband connections. If a firm sets high price
to extract surplus from high demand segments, it will certainly exclude many low
demand consumers. If it sets a low price in order to serve low demand segments,
it will forego profit from high demand consumers. Hence, it want to practice price
discrimination. We know that a monopoly firm can capture more of consumers’
surpluses by using a menu of self-selecting two part tariffs instead of uniform
pricing, see for instance Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984), Sharkey and Sib-
ley (1993), and Wilson (1993). However, when a consumer’s willingness to pay
is private information, the trade-off between exclusion of low demand segments
versus rent extraction from high demand segments still exists, and the relative
performance of two part tariffs over uniform pricing decline as the demand side
heterogeneity increases.
In this paper we explore an extension of a simple two part pricing arrangement
by assuming that the firm can observe a customer’s usage of its service along more
than one dimension. By monitoring consumers’ usage patterns, the firm is able
to offer a tariff targeted to low demand consumers on terms that differ from the
terms on which high demand consumers make their purchases, i.e., the firm uses
more than one instrument in the pricing decision. We show that this might imply
lower distortions towards low demand consumers in terms of the price-cost margin
compared to the bench-mark with one observable dimension. To illustrate the
general idea, let us take a closer look at a strategy used in broadband pricing.
Users of broadband services have very diverse needs when it comes to internet
surfing, e-mailing, music and video downloads, and high quality video and audio
streaming, and this reflects their demand for speed and their intensity of usage
with respect to download/upload. While surfing the internet is just faster on a
high speed connection, high quality video streaming will perform bad on low speed
connection. Hence, consumers’ willingness to pay for access speed depend partly
on which services he uses and partly on his usage intensity. When both dimensions
(speed and download) is observable, the firm should consider restrictions along
both as part of its screening decision.
Table 1 present an example. The broadband company Tiscali charge high
demand consumers £24.99 for broadband at 512kbps, while low demand con-
sumers pay £10 less for the same speed, but on different terms since they must
stay online less than 50 hours, or download less than 1Gb, per month. As we
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Table 1: Pricing of broadband, Tiscali (UK, June 2004)
Product Downstream speed Cost per month ($)
Broadbandx3 150kbps 15.99, Free usage
Broadbandx5 256kbps 19.99, Free usage
Broadbandx10 50 Hours 512kbps 19.99, After 50 hours 2p per minute
Broadbandx10 1Gb 512kbps 19.99, After 1Gb 2p per Mb
Broadbandx10 Unlimited 512kbps 24.99, Free usage
see, Tiscali sorts consumers by self-selection according to two instruments, speed
and download. Another example that is consistent with the recommendations in
this paper is the widespread practice of various kinds of calling circle tariffs, for
instance “Friends and Family” tariffs. Under a calling circle tariff, a subscriber is
billed according to aggregate minutes of calling to a restricted set of network sub-
scribers, and the price per minute varies conditional on the node of termination
(inside or outside the calling circle). Common in the examples above is that the
firm introduces a restriction in the use of the service in low demand consumers’
tariff, not really to restrict low types’ consumption, but to hurt high demand con-
sumers if they choose a tariff with a low price. The underlying assumption is that
consumers with different valuation for the service has distinctly different usage
pattern. Specifically, only low demand consumers are willing to accept a severe
restriction in the dispersion of calls/monthly download, against a reduction in
the cost of usage. Table 2 lists some other examples from telecommunications.
In the analysis, we assume that a monopoly firm sells a single generic good to
two consumer groups with different valuation for the good.1 Although it is clear
that there are distinct market segments, it is not possible for the firm to identify
a given consumer’s market segment ex ante, i.e., consumers’ willingness to pay
is private information. In order to simplify the interpretations and the intuition,
we choose to apply the model to a case with calling circle tariffs.2 However,
with some reinterpretations, the results are valid for most telecommunications
and digital services (as indicated in table 2). Consumers usage of the service can
be monitored along two dimensions, denoted call duration and call dispersion,
both being observed by the monopoly and both being continuous. Call dura-
tion is interpreted as a quantity variable, whereas call dispersion is related to
1Although telecommunications is subject to competition almost all over the world, we do
not add imperfect competition to the framework. The reason for doing this is simply that it
adds too much complexity (see Rochet and Stole (2003) and Stole (2001)).
2Firms’ use of calling circle tariffs has received some attention in other areas in the eco-
nomics literature as well. Wang and Wen (1998) consider a duopoly model with demand side
heterogeneity, where such pricing behavior enables a new firm to enter the market despite
the presence of consumer switching costs. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) examine the effects
of discriminatory pricing on the negotiated interconnection agreements between rival network
operators. In a recent publication written independently of this, Shi (2003) study the use of
calling circle tariffs from a social network theory perspective.
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Table 2: Examples on pricing of telecommunications services (June 2004)
Company/Product Service restriction Pricing arrangement
Vodafone (UK)
Perfect Fit
Lower rates anytime
Lower rates daytime
Lower rates evening/weekend
Two part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
Orange (UK)
Your Plan
Lower rates any network anytime
Lower rates Orange-Orange anytime
Lower rates Orange-Orange off-peak
Two part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
O2 (UK) Lower rates anytime
Lower rates daytime/evening time
Two part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
BT (UK)
Together 1,2,3
Low rate evening/weekend
Free calls evening/weekend
Free calls anytime
Two part tariffs
Telenor (Norway)
Friends & Family
Lower rates on calls to mobile
Lower rates on national calls
Lower rates on international calls
Two part tariffs
Tiscali (UK)
Dial-up internet access
Unlimited surfing anytime
Unlimited surfing daytime, weekdays
Unlimited surfing daytime all week
Flat rate
Per minute
outside hours
BT Broadband
512kbps
Less than 15Gb monthly download
Upgrade to free download
Flat rate
BT Broadband
1Mb
Less than 30Gb monthly download
Upgrade to free download
Flat rate
the concentration of calls made within the network. In addition, we assume that
consumers with different willingness to pay also have distinctly different calling
patterns. In particular, high demand consumers make calls to a large number of
subscribers, whereas low demand consumers make calls to a small number of sub-
scribers. Hence, call dispersion is an intrinsic part of consumers’ preferences, and
assumed to be perfectly correlated with consumers’ quantity preferences. High
dispersion subscribers can be thought of as business consumers while low disper-
sion subscribers can be thought of as residential consumers. The firm introduces
quantity distortions (high per unit price) towards low demand types, according
to the well-known model with nonlinear pricing in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Maskin and Riley (1984). In addition it introduces a restriction on the use of
the service in low demand consumers tariff, i.e., it restricts his calling circle by
restricting the fraction of the network he can reach.3
If we change the interpretation slightly, the model can be used to analyze
nonlinear pricing and bundling in a multiproduct monopoly setting. Assuming
3The monopoly sells its product in two “versions”, a “high-quality” version with unre-
stricted calling, and a “low-quality” version with a restriction in call dispersion (“damaging”).
Deneckere and McAfee (1996) analyze damaging in a framework with third degree price dis-
crimination, and show that the practice can lead to a Pareto improvement. Foros, Jensen and
Sand (1999) study the effects of damaging under two part tariffs with exogenous qualities.
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that the firm sells a very large number of products,4 we let the firm bundle a
subset of the products and charge units within this product bundle according
to a distinct two part tariff. Since the firm does not debundle completely we
refer to this practice as partial product bundling. In a model with unit demand,
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) study the strategy of bundling a large number of
information goods (goods with zero or very low marginal costs of production)
and selling them for a fixed price. One of their findings is that the firm should
offer a menu of different bundles aimed at each market segment and practice price
discrimination when consumers’ tastes are positively correlated.5 The seller can
for instance offer an “economy” bundle that is a subset of a “premium” bundle,
or “degrade” the quality of the product to disproportionally affect high-demand
consumers’ valuation (damaging). Armstrong (1999) study optimal multiproduct
nonlinear pricing when the firm offers a very large number of products, applicable
to telecommunications.6 When consumers’ tastes are correlated across products,
he finds that a menu of two part tariffs, each of which have prices proportional
to marginal costs, can extract almost all available profits. Note that the tariffs
applied in our model follow these recommendations since we assume that the
marginal cost do not vary over the product line. However, Armstrong (1999)
cover only the case where all products are sold to both consumer types.
Section 2 present consumers’ preferences with calling pattern heterogeneity.
The focus in section 3 is on the design of two part tariffs, depending on the
severity of the usage restriction, and subsequently on the trade offs the firm faces
when it decides the relative role of the two instruments at hand, i.e., restriction
of call dispersion and price-cost distortion. Section 4 study this in more detail
by specifying consumers’ distribution functions with respect to call dispersion.
Section 5 offer some concluding remarks.
4For instance, call minutes to different network nodes are grouped together into the same
sub-utility function, and the value a person places on one group of services is independent of
whether he consumes the other.
5The literature on bundling is large, but since it to a large extent deal with a setting with
only two products, and linear pricing, most is not relevant to our model.
6Multiproduct nonlinear pricing is also studied elsewhere. Mirman and Sibley (1980) con-
sider a multiproduct monopoly facing consumers who are differentiated by a single characteris-
tic, where the firm offer a menu of commodity bundles together with the price for the bundle.
Sibley and Srinagesh (1997) explore the difference between screening the different dimensions
of consumer types independently by means of two part tariffs and the alternative of bundling
all taste parameters to design a single two part tariff. Miravete (2001) study multidimensional
screening where different type components distinguish quality dimensions of products that can
be aggregated.
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2 A model with calling pattern heterogeneity
The market is served by a monopolist and resale opportunities are absent. The
cost function is assumed to be linear, the fixed cost is excluded from the measure
of profit and the marginal cost is normalized to zero. On the demand side there
are only two consumers (or equally large groups), type 1 with low willingness to
pay and type 2 with high willingness to pay. Hence, under a uniform price, type
2 would buy a larger quantity than type 1. A consumer’s type is unobservable
to the firm, but each type’s preferred calling pattern, described by the dispersion
of calls, is known. The reservation utility is assumed to be equal for the two
consumers and normalized to zero.
The types’ call dispersion is exogenous and we shall assume that type 2 has a
more dispersed calling pattern than type 1, and that this is common knowledge.
Call dispersion is described by consumers’ intensity of network node visitation,
i.e., how large fraction of a consumer’s calls are made to his favorite number,
how large fraction to the top-two numbers, top-three and so on. The network
node gives the identity of the party called and is not in itself of any interest
to the firm. However, the relative intensity of calls made to each network node
gives information about consumers’ preferences. Since we are only interested in
calls made by these two consumers, we can without loss of generality normalize
the “entire network” to 1, and say that type 2 always makes calls to the entire
network whereas type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern. Hence, call
dispersion can be seen as an intrinsic part of consumers’ preferences.7
7A similar problem is studied in Shi (2003). He describes the structure of a consumer’s social
network according to interpersonal tie strengths and the relational density of a personal network.
Each consumer’s demand for communication is determined by the number of strong versus weak
ties, and by each consumer’s valuation of communication with strong and weak ties. Consumers’
willingness to pay for communication with a strong link normally exceeds the willingness to
pay for communication with a weak link. However, Shi (2003) includes the possibility that the
demand curves for a strong tie and a weak tie crosses. Using a numeric example, Shi (2003)
reports two main results: If consumers with many loose ties are the high valuation segment,
he finds that the low valuation segment is charged below cost for communication with strong
ties and above cost for communication with strong ties. If consumers with many dense ties are
the high valuation segment, he finds that the low valuation segment is charged below cost for
communication with weak ties and above cost for communication with strong ties. The results
are driven by the assumptions about the demand curves together with the assumption that the
network sizes are equal.
Shi (2003) do not consider demand heterogeneity due to taste differences, or differences
in income levels, between consumers. The only characteristic that differ between consumers
is the number of strong versus weak ties in their personal communications network. The
distribution of these numbers are known, but the firm can not observe the characteristics of
individual personal communications networks. The setting is different in my paper: Demand
heterogeneity is due to unobservable differences in consumers’ tastes, and observable differences
in calling pattern. An additional assumption made in Shi (2003) is that it is optimal for the
firm to serve both consumer segments. Hence, he do not examine how increased observability
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We define call dispersion according to a cumulative distribution F1 (n) ≥
F2 (n) with a probability density function fi (n), i = 1, 2.
8 If a consumer is
restricted to make calls only to a n-fraction of the network, he will make calls to
those network nodes generating the largest consumer surplus. Fi (n) states how
large fraction of consumer i’s call minutes that are placed within the n-fraction
of the network, and fi (n) states consumer i’s intensity of calls to network node
n. The density function fi (n) is positive and integrable on the support n ∈ [0, 1],
and we will also assume that f1F2 ≤ f2F1.
We make the assumption that call dispersion is independent of the price per
call minute. This assumption may be questioned. However, there is no obvious
alternative assumption – i.e., that consumers’ calling pattern will be more con-
centrated or more dispersed when the price per call minute increases. Hence,
keeping call dispersion constant seem to be as good as any other assumption. On
the other hand, as we will see, call duration to each network node is decreasing
in the price per call minute.
A consumer of type θi derives a utility from making calls to a given network
node according to the following subutility function
vi(x, n) = θix− 1
2fi(n)
x2i (1)
We will assume that each consumer is billed according to a single two part
tariff Ti = {pi, Ei} (subscript i indicates that the tariff is intended for the con-
sumer of type θi, i = 1, 2). If a consumer of type θi finds it individual rational
to pay a fixed fee E, the price for each call minute is equal to p, and the total
call length to each network node maximizes the quasilinear subutility function
ui = vi(x, n)− px. Hence, expected call length to a given network node is
xi(p, n) = (θi − p)fi(n) (2)
A consumer’s aggregate utility is obtained by aggregating the subutility over
all possible network nodes. When each subutility function is quasilinear, the
aggregate demand function will appear to maximize the aggregated consumer
surplus, and a consumer’s gross surplus is represented by the area under the the
aggregate demand function. We abstract from the fact that some consumers may
have positive utility even in the case when consumption is zero.9 If the expected
of consumer heterogeneity affect the monopolist’s incentive to exclude low demand segments.
8For notation we use fi (n) ≡ f (n; θi), Fi (n) ≡ F (n; θi). The distribution of n conditional
on θ2 first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of n conditional on θ1, if θ2 ≥ θ1.
This assumption captures that call dispersion is perfectly correlated with call duration.
9A subscriber may want a network connection in order to receive calls only, or to be able
to make emergency calls. Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982) study nonlinear pricing under the
presence of demand externalities, for instance when the benefit a consumer receives in a com-
munication network depend on their access to communication partners and increase with the
size of the network.
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net utility from making calls weakly exceeds a consumer’s reservation utility he
will find it beneficial to subscribe to the network.
Aggregate demand for a consumer of type θi over all possible network nodes
is given by
Qi (p) ≡ Q(p, θi) =
∫ 1
0
(θi − p) fi (n) dn = (θi − p) , (3)
i = 1, 2. Since θ2 > θ1 it must be the case that Q2 (p) > Q1 (p) ∀p, Qi (p) is
nonincreasing in p, i = 1, 2.
Aggregate demand for a consumer of type θi over the n-fraction of the network
most frequently called is given by
Q¯i (p, n) ≡ Q(p, θi, n) =
∫ n
0
(θi − p) fi (n) dn = (θi − p) Fi (n) , (4)
Q¯i (p, n) is nonincreasing in p and nondecreasing in n, i = 1, 2. It is not necessary
to impose the single crossing on the subutility functions in (1) since the firm is
trying to sort consumers only on the basis of aggregate consumption. Hence the
restricted demand curves in (4) can cross.
The demand curve in (4) resembles the one in (3), except that n affects the
intercept and the slope of the individual demand curves. However, these are
perfectly (negatively) correlated and the firm can infer about the slope when it
knows the intercept (and vice-versa).10
Consumer surplus under a two part tariff T = {p, E} for some given n ≤ 1 is
given by
CSi (p, E, n) =
∫ θi
p
(θi − p)Fi (n) dp− E, i = 1, 2, (5)
CS2 (p, E, n) > CS1 (p, E, n) . (6)
When both types choose consumption subject to the same tariff, type 2 obtains
a larger surplus.
We now proceed in two steps. First, we solve for the optimal two part tariffs,
T1 intended for type 1 and T2 intended for type 2, treating n as exogenous. Next,
having obtained a reduced form profit as a function of n we solve for the optimal
size of the allowed calling circle in the two part tariffs T1 and T2, assuming that
they are excluded from making calls outside the calling circle. This is only a
simplifying assumption, and we will also report the results when the assumption
is relaxed.
10Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987) solve for the optimal nonlinear price schedule when
a monopolist is uncertain about both the slopes and the intercepts of the individual demand
curves it faces, assuming a continuum of types and that the distributions of slopes and intercepts
are independent.
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3 Two part tariffs
Given the slopes of the demand curves and asymmetric information over θ, the
practice that maximizes profit is to offer different two part tariffs intended for
the two consumer types. We know the equilibrium in this model as a solution
where p1 > 0 and p2 = c. The fixed fee in type 1’s tariff is chosen in such a
way that he receives his reservation utility, and the fixed fee in type 2’s tariff
is chosen such that type 2 does not choose the tariff intended for type 1. More
formally, consider the model as follows. A two part tariff is characterized by a
triple {p, E; n}, p is the marginal price, E is a fixed fee and n ≤ 1 is the fraction
of the network that can be reached with the tariff. When the reservation utility
is normalized to zero, it is individually rational to accept any tariff {p, E; n} that
yields nonnegative consumer surplus. The two individual rationality constraints
are
CSi (pi, Ei, ni) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (IRi)
Since CS2(.) > CS1(.), IR2 can not bind whenever IR1 is weakly met. Hence if
type 1 is served, IR1 is the only binding individual rationality constraint. The
other relevant constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints
CSi (pi, Ei, ni) ≥ CSi (pj, Ej, nj) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (ICi)
The incentive constraint requires that a consumer buys the bundle intended for
his type. IC1 can never bind if IC2 is weakly met. Hence, the incentive constraint
is downward binding only.11
It is never profitable to restrict type 2’s demand and any restriction in call
dispersion will only occur in the tariff intended for type 1. Henceforth we use the
notations n2 = 1 and n1 = n. The firm is searching for two part tariffs {p1, E1, n}
and {p2, E2, 1} ≡ {p2, E2} in order to maximize profit. If n is fixed we have the
following maximization problem
Π = max
p1,p2,E1,E2
{
E1 + p1 (θ1 − p1) F1 (n) + E2 + p2 (θ2 − p2)
}
(7)
subject to pi ≥ 0, Ei ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2), IR1, and IC2
E1 =
∫ θ1
p1
(θ1 − p)F1 (n) dp, (8)
E2 = E1 +
∫ θ2
p2
(θ2 − p) dp−
∫ θ2
p1
(θ2 − p) F2 (n) dp. (9)
11See for instance Tirole (1988) pp 153-154, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp 247-248.
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The outcome is unique with p1 ≥ p2 = 0, and E2 > E1, whenever θ2 > θ1 and
both types are served. The last term in (9) illustrates the two instruments that
can be used to reduce the information rent. The firm can increase p1 or decrease
n. If the firm chooses not to serve type 1, the unique outcome is a cost-plus-fixed
fee tariff, p2 = 0, and the entire consumer surplus is extracted via the fixed fee.
We now turn to the question of how severe the restriction in call dispersion
in type 1’s tariff should be. As a benchmark however, we first repeat the profit
maximizing two part tariffs in the single-dimensional case with n = 1. If the firm
has no ability to monitor call dispersion, or to condition a tariff on a calling circle
restriction, n1 = n2 = 1. This is the canonical model with two-types and single-
dimensional screening which is examined in, for instance, Sharkey and Sibley
(1993).
Lemma 1 (Single-dimensional screening) A monopoly that is unable to ob-
serve anything but individual quantity purchases will increase the unit price in
type 1’s tariff above marginal cost in order to reduce the information rent to type
2. If consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently large, the monopoly will exclude type
1 from buying.
(i) For θ2
θ1
∈ [1, 3
2
]
the monopoly will serve both types and offer two different
two part tariffs {p1, E1} and {0, E2} given by
p1 = θ2 − θ1, E1 = 12 (2θ1 − θ2)2 , E2 = 12 (2θ1 − θ2)2 + 12
(
θ22 − θ21
)
.
(ii) For θ2
θ1
> 3
2
the monopoly will exclude type 1 and offer a cost-plus-fixed-fee
tariff {0, E2} and extract all surplus from type 2. The tariff is given by
E2 =
1
2
θ22.
Lemma 1 is simple to verify by substituting for F1(n) = F2(n) = 1 in the
above maximization problem (7) to (9). The information rent to type 2 is exactly
balanced against the gain from serving type 1 when θ2/θ1 = 3/2, i.e., type 1 is
served only if θ2/θ1 ≤ 3/2 (cut-off rate).
Next, we turn to the case of a wider strategy set, i.e., where the tariff intended
for type 1 may have a calling circle restriction. According to (3) and (4), a
restriction in call dispersion causes a negative horizontal shift in the demand
curves. Type 2’s gross surplus from consuming the good is evaluated according
to type 2’s true willingness to pay, Q2(p), while he is given an information rent
as if the heterogeneity was described according to the demand curves Q¯1(p, n)
and Q¯2(p, n). A distortion in type 1’s tariff makes it less tempting for the high
demand type to mimic the low demand type. Although type 1 also suffers under
such distortions, he is not as seriously affected as type 2.
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Lemma 2 (Two-dimensional screening) If consumers’ calling patterns are
type dependent, and can be monitored by the monopoly, a restriction on type 1’s
call dispersion serves as an alternative to a distortion in the unit price to type
1. Assume for now that both types are served and that θ2
θ1
is not too large. For
a given restriction n ≤ 1, type 2 is offered a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff {0, En2 } and
type 1 is offered a tariff {pn1 , En1 , n} where
pn1 =


0 for θ2
θ1
∈
[
1, F1(n)
F2(n)
]
,
θ2 − θ1 F1(n)F2(n) for θ2θ1 ∈
(
F1(n)
F2(n)
, 1 + F1(n)
F2(n)
]
,
En1 and E
n
2 are determined by (8) and (9).
Lemma 2 is verified by solving maximization problem (7) to (9). Under our
assumptions on F1 and F2, p
n
1 is nondecreasing in n, continuous, and differen-
tiable whenever pn1 > 0. From the pricing rule in Lemma 2 we see that larger
heterogeneity in call duration (θ2 is large relative to θ1) results in a larger unit
price. Further, because type 2 consumers suffer more both from a restriction in
call dispersion and from an increase in the unit price, they serve as alternative
instruments to relax the incentive constraint. This is reflected in the result that
pn1 is decreased (increased) when n is decreased (increased). In both cases the
means is to restrict type 2’s consumption if he selects type 1’s tariff, by way of a
high unit price or access to a smaller network (reduced opportunity set).
Both instruments are costly to use in the sense that type 1’s consumption is
de facto restricted. In either case the consequence is that type 1 will make fewer
calls. The firm loses income from these calls and since type 1 loses surplus on
these calls he is not willing to participate unless the fixed fee is reduced. On the
other hand, type 1’s tariff is no longer as tempting for type 2 and the fixed fee
from type 2 can be increased. The optimal trade-off in the firm’s use of the two
instruments depends on the relative effect they have on the two types’ demand.
Assuming that both types are served we use Lemma 2 and write the expected
profit in (7) as a function of n
Π(n) =


1
2
θ22 +
1
2
θ21
F1(n)
2
F2(n)
− F1 (n) θ1 (θ2 − θ1) if pn1 > 0,
θ21F1 (n) +
1
2
θ22 (1− F2 (n)) if pn1 = 0.
(10)
The firm maximizes profit with respect to n and the tariffs are determined by
Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (Restriction in call dispersion) The firm separates between high
and low demand consumers by distorting type 1’s tariff with respect to call dis-
persion, alone or together with a distortion in the unit price.
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(i) Type 1 is offered a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff with a restriction in call disper-
sion n˜ ∈ (0, 1] if n˜ exists such that
F1(n˜)
F2(n˜)
≥ θ2
θ1
≥
√
2f1(n˜)
f2(n˜)
(ii) Type 1 is offered a two part tariff with a unit price distortion and a restric-
tion in call dispersion nˆ ∈ (0, 1] if nˆ exists such that
θ2
θ1
≥ 1 + F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
(
1− 1
2
f2(nˆ)
f1(nˆ)
F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
)
≥ F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
The tariffs are subsequently determined according to Lemma 2.
The firm chooses to place a restriction in call dispersion in order to satisfy the
condition ∂Π/∂n ≤ 0. The last inequality in part (i) of Lemma 3 states the
condition for pn1 = 0, whereas the first inequality in part (ii) of Lemma 3 states
the condition for pn1 > 0. In the first case, the firm only has to trade-off how an
increase in n affects the fixed fees. Hence, if the heterogeneity in call duration
is low relative to the heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is more likely to
be served with a flat rate tariff with a calling circle restriction, i.e., when θ2/θ1
is small and/or F1/F2 is large. In the opposite case, the firm will offer type
1 consumers a two part tariff with a calling circle restriction together with a
distorted unit price.
The firm will restrict type 1’s calling circle whenever there is heterogeneity
in the types’ calling pattern. Since the tariff intended for type 2 has no re-
striction in call dispersion, the demand curves Q¯1(p, n) and Q2(p) never cross if
θ2/θ1 ≥ F1(n), which is always met. It does not matter whether the demand
curve Q¯2(p, n) crosses Q¯1(p, n) since type 2 is not expected to make his purchases
along Q¯2(p, n). When call dispersion conditional on consumer type θ is known,
we can characterize the firm’s pricing policy.
4 A numerical example
For simplicity we assume that type 2 make calls of equal length to all nodes, i.e.,
f2(n) is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], f2(n) = 1 and F2(n) = n.
We assume that type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern by placing more
probability weight to the left tail of the distribution.
The Beta-distribution allows for the possibility that the call length may vary
over nodes of call termination. Define type 1’s dispersion of calls according to
12
the following p.d.f and the c.d.f.12
f1(n, w) =
{
w(1− n)w−1 if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(11)
F1(n, w) =
{
1− (1− n)w if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(12)
The firm seeks to maximize profit with respect to n according to the optimality
condition in Lemma 3. Henceforth, we define a variable t ≡ θ2
θ1
. The monopoly’s
pricing strategy is given in the following propositions. Proposition 1, 2, and 3
are obtained by applying Lemma 3 and are proved in Appendix A. Figure 1
summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 If heterogeneity in call dispersion is sufficiently large relative to
the heterogeneity in call duration, type 1 is served with a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff
{0, En1 , n∗}, n∗ ∈ [n′, n′′). This occurs for t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′, or for 2 ≤ w ≤ 1 + 12w. n′
and n′′ decrease whereas t′ and t′′ increase as the heterogeneity in call dispersion
increases (w increases).
Proposition 1 shows that a calling circle restriction in type 1’s tariff may be
sufficient to separate the types. The larger the heterogeneity in call dispersion,
the more powerful is a calling circle restriction as an instrument to separate the
types. This can be utilized by the firm in two different ways. The firm can achieve
less costly separation by decreasing n (reflecting that n′′ decreases as w increases),
or serve more types with a social efficient tariff (reflecting that t′′ increases as
w increases). Consumers with different willingness to pay are charged identical
unit price (equal to marginal cost), but type 2 pays a larger fixed fee. In terms
of pricing, this resembles first degree price discrimination, except that type 1 is
not allowed to make calls to the entire network.
Proposition 2 When the heterogeneity is more moderate and balanced, type 1
consumers are offered a two part tariff {pn1 , En1 , n∗∗}, pn1 > 0, n∗∗ ∈ [0, n′). This
occurs for t′ ≤ t ≤ t′′ together with w < 2.
12This is the beta distribution over n with shape parameters v = 1 and w > 1 on [0, 1]. The
probability density function for the beta distribution is
f (n, v, w) =


nv−1 (1− n)w−1
B (v, w)
if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
where the shape parameters v and w are positive numbers. With v = 1, the shape of the
distribution is determined by w, the higher is w the larger is the mass for low n.
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Proposition 2 show that when the heterogeneity in call duration increases,
it is necessary to increase the restriction in call dispersion (decrease the calling
circle) in order to restore incentive compatibility. A calling circle restriction will
always be used, either alone (Proposition 1) or in combination with distortionary
pricing (Proposition 2).
Proposition 3 If heterogeneity in call duration is sufficiently large relative to
heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is excluded from making purchases. This
occurs for t >
√
2w if w < 2 or for t > 1+ 1
2
w if w > 2. Type 1 is served in more
cases relative to the single-dimensional case.
Although increased heterogeneity in call dispersion reduces the incentive to
exclude type 1, proposition 3 states that this incentive still exists.13 Typically,
the possibility of type 1 being served increases as the heterogeneity in call dis-
persion increases because this increases the ‘observability’ of the two types. The
generalization of this is the fact that the firm is always better, or at least equally
well, off with an additional observable and instrument at hand.14
4.1 Pricing under a three part tariff
I the previous section, low demand consumers were excluded from making calls
outside the calling circle. In this section, we allow low demand consumers to
make calls outside the calling circle at a separate unit price p¯n1 . Calls to the
calling circle is charged at a per unit price pn1 . Hence, high demand consumers
are offered a two part tariff {pn2 , En2 } and low demand consumers are offered a
three part tariff {pn1 , p¯n1 , En1 }.
In order to solve the extended problem, we have to add the utility from these
calls to the individual rationality constraint for low demand types (IR1), to the
incentive constraint for the high demand types (IC2), and revenues from sales to
the profit function. The maximization problem can be found in Appendix B, and
the problem is stated in B.1 – B.3. The insights are summarized in figure 2(a) –
2(c).
When the heterogeneity in call dispersion is low, it is more likely that low
demand types are served with a three part tariff (figure 2(a)). However, at the
same time, the two unit prices, pn1 and p¯
n
1 are close to each other when w is close
13Instead of saying that n∗ = 0 we could say that n∗ = 1 but let pn1 be sufficiently high to
ensure that Q1(p1) = 0.
14Sappington (1983) shows this in a regulation model. A regulator that is uncertain about
a multiproduct firm’s production technology achieves additional information by observing the
production level of each product. Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey and Tirole (1988) generalize the
case with several observable variables.
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Figure 1: Pricing policy towards type 1, w = 1.7. The larger the heterogeneity in
call dispersion (high w) the larger is the possibility that type 1 is served and that
he is served with an efficient tariff, i.e., a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff.
to 1. When the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases, it is more likely that
low demand types are charged at marginal cost for call to the calling circle (in
figure 2(b), t′ is closer to t′′). At the same time it becomes less likely that the
firm will use a three part tariff (t′′′ closer to 1). When the heterogeneity in call
dispersion is large, low demand types’ calls to the calling circle is always charged
at marginal cost (figure 2(c)). At the same time, it becomes less likely that low
demand types are served with a three part tariff.
The example above shows that the firm moves from a simple two part tariff to
a calling circle tariff as the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases. In contrast
to Shi (2003), we find that both unit prices are above marginal cost. In addition,
by allowing more flexibility in the firm’s pricing strategy, we show that a three
part tariff is optimal only when the heterogeneity in call dispersion (w) or call
duration (θ2/θ1) is relative small.
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(a) Low heterogeneity in call dispersion,
three part tariff for t ≤ t′′′ (1 ≤ w ≤ 1.6).
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(b) Moderate heterogeneity in call dispersion,
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= 0 for t ≤ t′ (1.6 ≤ w ≤ 2).
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(c) Large heterogeneity in call dispersion,
pn
1
= 0 whenever type 1 is served (w ≥ 2).
Figure 2: Low demand types are served with a three part tariff for θ2/θ1 ≤, t′′′.
If θ2/θ1 ≤ t′, calls to the calling circle is charged at marginal cost. For θ2/θ1 ∈
[t′′′, t′′], low demand types are served with a calling circle tariff only. Low demand
types are excluded for θ2/θ1 > t
′′′.
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5 Concluding remarks
Price discrimination is socially desirable if it induces the firm to serve market
segments it otherwise would have excluded. Under second degree price discrim-
ination, a widely used sorting mechanism is to give quantity discounts to high
demand segments; Low demand segments pay a low monthly fee and a higher
per unit price, whereas high demand segments pay a high monthly fee and a per
unit price equal to marginal cost, and high demand and low demand consumers
self-select into distinct market segments by their tariff choice. However, when the
difference in consumers’ willingness to pay is very large, pure quantity discounts
are not longer sufficient to discriminate between high and low demand segments;
The firm still prefers to serve high demand consumers only. Under such circum-
stances it is desirable to use additional, or alternative sorting mechanisms. In
this paper, this is done by using information about the two consumers’ calling
patterns in addition to monitoring their quantity purchases. Both dimensions are
observable, and both vary systematically with consumers’ true willingness to pay;
High demand consumers buy many units and have a dispersed calling pattern;
Low demand consumers buy fewer units and have a concentrated calling pattern.
Therefore, they are both appropriate as sorting mechanisms.
In our model, the firm can introduce quantity distortions towards low demand
types, according to the well-known model with nonlinear pricing. Another instru-
ment is to introduce a restriction on the use of the service. The firm typically
finds it optimal to combine distortions along the two dimensions. Then, type 1
consumers face a two part tariff with a marginal price possibly above marginal
cost, together with a restriction on the usage pattern (the calling circle). How-
ever, the calling circle restriction allows the firm to reduce the distortion in the
pricing rule in the low-demand type’s tariff. Whenever the monopoly firm finds
it profitable to serve type 1, and there is observable heterogeneity in the use of
the service, it will always impose a calling circle restriction in type 1’s contract.
Moreover, this restriction is sometimes sufficient to achieve separation.
The model shows that the firm chooses to serve market segments it otherwise
would have excluded with an additional sorting dimension. Hence, not only
will profit increase, but sorting along this dimension may also lead to a Pareto
improvement. Finally, the model suggests that it might be possible to practice
a pricing strategy closer to flat rate pricing by separating consumers by other
means than price-cost distortions. Hence, the outcome would be closer to first
degree price discrimination.
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Appendix
A Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
The profit function given in (10) is continuous and concave. From Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 we derive the conditions pn1 = 0 and Π
′
n = 0, which are the two curves
in figure 1. The slopes of these are given by
dn
dt
∣∣∣∣
pn
1
=0
=
n2
nf1 − F1 ≤ 0 (A.1)
dn
dt
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
=


√
2f1
f1n
≤ 0 if pn1 = 0
2n3f 21
2f1(nf1 − F1)2 + nF 21 f1n
≤ 0 if pn1 > 0
(A.2)
with notation f1n ≡ df1(n, w)/dn, f1w ≡ df1(n, w)/dw and so on.
When w increases there will be a positive shift in the curve defining pn1 = 0.
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
pn
1
=0
=
F1w
n
≥ 0 (A.3)
The shift in the curve defining Π′n = 0 is negative for larger values of n and
positive for smaller values of n.
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
=


−f1w
f1n
if pn1 = 0
F1w
n
− 1
2n2
F1(2F1wf1 − f1w)
f 21
if pn1 > 0
(A.4)
When w increases it places more probability weight to the lower end. Hence,
f1w is positive for smaller values of n and negative for higher values of n, while
f1n is negative for all n ∈ [0, 1].
Next, we evaluate the shift along the t-axis
limn→0+
[
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
]
=


1√
2w
if pn1 = 0
1
2
if pn1 > 0
(A.5)
Hence, since the shift is positive along the t-axis, the shift along the n-axis
must be negative, implying that t′′ is increasing and n′′ is decreasing in w.
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We can show that n′ decreases when the heterogeneity in call dispersion in-
creases by differentiating the condition
F1(n
′, w)
n′
=
√
2f1(n′, w) (A.6)
which gives us
dn′
dw
= − n
2f1w − nF1w
√
2f1
n2f1n −
√
2f1(nf1 − F1)
≤ 0 (A.7)
Since we have t′ = F1(n
′,w)
n′
, which is monotonic with dt′/dn′ < 0 (by A.1), t′ is
increasing in w. By inspection we can conclude that the firm offers a cost-plus-
fixed-fee tariff for t < t′ and n > n′. This completes the proof of Propositions 1
and 2.
When w = 2 the curves are tangent at the point (t, n) = (2, 0) and t′ = t′′.
limn→0+
[
F1
n
]
= w (A.8)
limn→0+
[√
2f1
]
=
√
2w (A.9)
limn→0+
[
1 +
F1
n
(
1− 1
2
F1
f1
)]
= 1 +
1
2w
(A.10)
The shift in the curve defining pn1 = 0 along the t-axis is given by
limn→0+
[
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
pn
1
=0
]
= 1 (A.11)
The shift in (A.11) is larger than (A.5). Since w > 1 type 1 is for certain
served when t < 3/2. Together with the preceding statements this completes the
proof of Proposition 3.
B Pricing under a three part tariff
The maximization problem is given by
Π = max
pn
1
,p¯n
1
,pn
2
,En
1
,En
2
{
En1 + p
n
1 (θ1 − pn1 ) F1 (n) +
p¯n1 (θ1 − p¯n1 ) (1− F1 (n)) + En2 + pn2 (θ2 − p2)
}
(B.1)
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subject to pni ≥ 0, p¯n1 ≥ 0, Eni ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2), IR1, and IC2:
En1 =
∫ θ1
pn
1
(θ1 − p)F1 (n) dp +
∫ θ1
p¯n
1
(θ1 − p) (1− F1) (n) dp, (B.2)
En2 = E
n
1 +
∫ θ2
pn
2
(θ2 − p) dp−
∫ θ2
pn
1
(θ2 − p) F2 (n) dp−∫ θ2
p¯n
1
(θ2 − p) (1− F2) (n) dp. (B.3)
The unit prices that solve the maximization problem above is the following
pn2 = 0 (B.4)
pn1 = θ2 − θ1 F1(n)F2(n) (B.5)
p¯n1 = θ2 − θ1 1−F1(n)1−F2(n) (B.6)
The firms profit under the different pricing strategies are given by the following
expressions. If the firm offers a three part tariff to low demand types
Π3p =


1
2
θ22 (1− F2) + θ1 (θ1 − θ2 (1− F1)) + 12θ21 (1−F1)
2
(1−F2) if p
n
1 = 0
1
2
θ22 − θ1 (θ2 − θ1) + 12θ21
(
F 2
1
F2
+ (1−F1)
2
(1−F2)
)
if pn1 > 0
(B.7)
If the firm offer a calling circle tariff to low demand types we have the sam profit
as in section 3.
Π2p =
{
θ21F1 +
1
2
θ22 (1− F2) if pn1 = 0
1
2
θ22 − F1θ1 (θ2 − θ1) + 12θ21
F 2
1
F2
if pn1 > 0
(B.8)
The firm prefers to serve the low demand consumer only with a calling circle
tariff rather than a three part tariff if
θ2
θ1
≥ 1 + 1− F1
2 (1− F2) (B.9)
and the unit price in the calling circle is equal to marginal cost if
θ2
θ1
≥ F1
F2
(B.10)
Figure 2 shows the optimal choice of n for any given heterogeneity in call duration,
θ2/θ1 = t. That is, the curves represents the condition dΠ/dn = 0, where the
relevant profit function in B.7 and B.8 are chosen according to B.9 and B.10.
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